Pennsylvania and the Uniform Rules of Evidence: Presumptions and Dead Man Statutes by Levin, A. Seavey
University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
FOUNDED 1852
Formerly
American Law Register
VOLUME 103 OCTOBER, 1954 No. 1
PENNSYLVANIA AND THE UNIFORM RULES
OF EVIDENCE: PRESUMPTIONS AND
DEAD MAN STATUTES*
A. Leo Levin t
THE BACKGROUND
"The best proof of progress in this branch of the law," Zechariah
Chafee once said of evidence, "would be its virtual disappearance from
our appellate courts." 1 Thirty years later the evidentiary atmosphere
is still described as "[h] ellish dark, and smells of cheese." 2 The spate
of judicial opinions continues unabated 3 while the commentators be-
moan "the multiplicity of the rules and their unreality." ' If, however,
contemporary legal literature reveals no lack of criticism of the law that
is, neither is it devoid of significant effort toward improvement. Ours
is a reformation period in the history of adjective law and there is more
optimism than pessimism in the statement that "evidence is now where
* This is the first installment of a two-part Article.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author
wishes to express his indebtedness for research assistance to David C. Harrison
of the third year class.
1. Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1921: Esidence, 35 HARv. L. REv.
302 (1922). Cf. 1 WiGmoRE, EvlDoEcE 259 (3d ed. 1940) : "A complete abolition of
the rules [of evidence] is at least arguable,--not merely in theory, but in realizable
fact."
2. The quotation is used by way of preface in Cleary, Evidence As a Problem
if; Communicating, 5 VAND. L. Rzv. 277 (1952).
3. Chafee used American Digest headnotes to judge volume of litigation. See
supra note 1, at n.1. A comparison with recent equivalent entries reveals virtually
no change. For discussion of trends in the volume of litigation over particular
rules see Wigmore's preface to the third edition of his ten-volume treatise, op. cit.
mipra note 1, at vii. Cf. id. at xii: "It is a pity that the book has had to be so large.
But if the Legislators will continue so copiously to legislate, and if Judges still re-
fuse to justify with jejunity their judgments, shall not Authors continue assiduously
to amass and to annotate these luciferous lucubrations for the benefit of the Bar,
so long as the Bar incumbently bears this burden"?
4. Cleary, supra note 2 at 277, where he adds: "Possibly the unreality is what
causes the multiplicity."
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the law of forms of action and common law pleading was in the early
part of the nineteenth century." '
The rate of recent change in matters of pleading and practice is
too fresh in mind to need retelling here. Hardly more than fifteen
years have passed since conformity, "as near as may be," passed from
the federal courts to be replaced by a set of national rules which stimu-
lated the beginnings of a new conformity by the states. That the Fed-
eral Rules sired so many others in their own image is, however, of sec-
ondary importance to the fact that they served, on a broad scale, as a
potent catalyst to reexamination of procedure. New techniques, a will-
ingness to experiment, and recognition of the need for developing a
modern adjective law-these were the major contributions felt even in
jurisdictions which rejected the particular conclusions of the federal
draftsmen. Pennsylvania, no less than others, has been engaged in re-
examination, and the results of a continuing, productive process con-
tinue to be promulgated by its supreme court.'
But what of evidence? That it can boast no comparable record of
achievement is all too clear, yet since the early 1920's substantial quan-
tities of time and energy, of coin and talent, have been dedicated to its
improvement.7 There has been a variety of suggested changes and
certainly our statute books do record some progress.8  Yet, without
underestimating the significance of piece meal revision, it seems safe
to assert that the key project of the period was the American Law In-
stitute's Model Code and an understanding of the unusual course it
ran may put in focus the far different proposal soon to be the subject of
legislative debate.9
The Institute's Council had early determined against a Restate-
ment of existing law for it found that the rules of evidence "in numer-
ous and important instances are so defective that instead of being the
means of developing truth, they operate to suppress it"; and since,
as William Draper Lewis phrased it, "[a] bad rule of law is not cured
5. MORGAN, FORWARD TO MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 5 (1942).
6. See, e.g., the new and amended Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure promul-
gated by the Supreme Court April 12, 1954, particularly PA. R. Crv. P. 4001 et Seq.
(effective July 1, 1954) governing depositions and discovery which were revised to
reflect the experience of some three years under an earlier version.
7. See Ladd, A Modern Code of Ezidence, 27 IowA L. REv. 213, 216-17 (1942).
8. See 9 U.L.A., Evidence Acts (Supp. 1953). The Uniform Photographic
Copies of Business and Public Records as Evidence Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§§ 141-43 (Purdon Supp. 1953) was adopted as recently as 1951.
9. The Pennsylvania Bar Association's Committee on Judicial Administration
now has before it the recently promulgated Uniform Rules of Evidence. 25 PA.
B.A.Q. 373 (1954). Judge Harold L. Ervin, formerly chairman of the Committee,
heads the sub-committee on the Uniform Rules. J. Wesley McWilliams is currently
chairman of the Committee. There is likewise substantial discussion in other states.
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by clarification," " the ALI set out to revise rather than restate.
Financed by a Carnegie grant of $40,000, staffed by the highest order
of legal talent serving as Reporter, Assistant Reporter, Advisers and
Consultants, 1 the project had an immediate impact. Interest ran high
and expectations were not far behind. California promptly abandoned
a local revision effort which had already made substantial progress. 2
A monograph of the American Bar Association's Special Committee
on Improving the Administration of Justice spoke of "a compact, clear-
cut, and authoritative statement" which "would alone be worthy of the
effort of drafting a model code."' 3 No wonder that the tentative drafts
of the yet unfinished product were the subject of discussion at over
thirty bar association meetings and institutes throughout the country. 4
Finally, in 1942 the American Law Institute formally promul-
gated its Model Code of Evidence. "As to the form of the Code,"
wrote the Reporter, "it is so drafted that it can be adopted as a body
of rules by those courts which have the power to regulate evidence and
procedure by rule or can be enacted as a code of evidence by a legis-
lature." '" The draftsmen might have been spared their concern; there
were no adoptions.
It would be fruitless at this juncture to reargue the merits of the
Model Code, so highly praised and so roundly condemned.', A con-
summate piece of scholarship, it fell prey to misinterpretation and mis-
construction. 7 Rightly understood, many of its provisions were highly
controversial; misunderstood, they were impossible. Nor was the com-
10. Lwis, INTRODUCTION TO MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE viii (1942).
11. Id. at ix. Professor Edmund M. Morgan served as Reporter, Professor
John M. Maguire as Assistant Reporter and John H. Wigmore as Chief Consultant.
The advisory committee included Judges Augustus N. Hand, Learned Hand, Henry
T. Lummus, J. Russell McElroy, Robert P. Patterson; Charles E. Wyzanski, Esq.,
of the Boston Bar (now a Federal District Court judge) ; and academicians Wilbur
H. Cherry, Laurence H. Eldredge, William G. Hale, Mason Ladd, Charles T.
McCormick.
12. Chadbourn, Uniform Rules of Evidence, (Los Angeles, Cal.) Metropolitan
News, March 19, 1954, p. 1, cols. 2, 3; 14 CAL. STATE B.J., Part II, 17 (1939).
13. Ladd, supra note 7, at 218. This article was also published as a monograph
by The Special Committee on Improving the Administration of Justice of the
American Bar Association. See id. at 213, n.*.
14. 19 PROCEEDINGs A.L.I. 65-66 (1942).
15. Morgan, supra note 5, at 69.
16. The Committee on Administration of Justice of the State Bar of California
reported its conclusions: "[We] earnestly recommend that the Bar should be on the
alert to resist to its utmost at the coming or any succeeding session of the Legisla-
ture the enactment into law of the Code or any of the parts thereof." Report,
19 CAL. S.B.J. 262, 283 (1944), discussed in Chadbourn, supra note 12, at p. 8,
col. 3. Cf. Judge Gard in Panel on Uniform Rules of Evidence, 8 Apx. L. REv.
44 (1953-54): "I think if any one broad criticism may be made of'the Model Code
it is that it is academically perfect."
17. See Chadbourn, supra note 12 at p. 8, col. 3, quoting from Hale, Report of
Committee on Administration of Justice on the Model Code of Evidence-A Reply,
22 CAL. S.B.J. 188 (1947).
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plex form of the Code's structure, with its myriad cross references, an
aid to general acceptance. Understandably, the Institute's model soon
passed from the limelight of active legislative consideration.' 8 No less
understandably, however, this important piece of work, which did not
fail of influence in the development of case law, became the starting
point for a further attempt at codification.
In 1948 Pennsylvania's William A. Schnader, a member of the
Executive Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, took the initiative in inducing that body to draft
a suitable code of evidence. 9 From the start it was thought that the
Model Code would prove useful as "a basis from which to work" and
the cooperation of the American Law Institute was solicited20 and
forthcoming.2 In 1949 the project was approved and the task of draft-
ing continued for four years. The product of this most recent effort,
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, adopted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the Ameri-
can Bar Association in August, 1953, and only this May endorsed by
the American Law Institute itself, has now become the center of dis-
cussion and debate.
The details of the transition from Institute Code to Commis-
sioner's Rules are not without interest. They reveal that more trans-
pired between the adoption of the former in 1942 and of the latter in
1953 than a change of venue, or even of forum. Above all they dem-
onstrate that the two proposals must be carefully distinguished and that
no plea of res judicata should be allowed to effect ready dismissal of
the Uniform Rules. In a sense the Rules are a product of the profes-
sion's resistance to the earlier proposal and a further glance at the re-
sistance will prove rewarding. Of particular relevance is the Pennsyl-
vania story.
Even before official promulgation of the Model Code the Penn-
sylvania State Bar Association took action "to determine the respects
in which it is in accord with or differs from the Pennsylvania law of
evidence." 2 The narrow task of comparison accomplished, in 1945 a
18. It was utilized in the preparation of a proposed code for Missouri, see Com-
ment, 14 Mo. L. Rav. 251, 252 (1949) and its vitality in legal periodicals persisted.
Beginning in 1945 and continuing through much of 1947, the Wisconsin Law Review
ran a series of articles on various provisions of the Model Code, most of them
under the general title, A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin? An oft-repeated in-
troductory note emphasizes that "It is not a purpose either to promote or to dis-
courage the adoption of [the Model] Code." E.g., 1945 Wis. L. REv. 192, 374, 593;
1946 Wis. L. REv. 81, 147.
19. [1948] HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFRECE OF CommIssioNERs ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 92.
20. Id. at 92, 94. Cf. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENcE, PREFATORY NOTE 3 (1953).
21. Id. at 3-4.
22. 47 ANNUAL RE'. PA. Bg Ass'N 281 (1941).
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basic report was prepared by the subcommittee concerned evaluating
the material.23 This report was unanimous in a number of important
respects, divided in one. There was agreement that the Code as drafted
should be disapproved. Most significantly, however, the members were
unanimous in their "convictions that the Pennsylvania law of evidence
was far from satisfactory; that it ought to be improved; and that it
could be improved by the adoption of some of the provisions contained
in the code." 24 They were not agreed, however, on the best course of
action to follow. A majority of four recommended that the subcom-
mittee be provided with adequate professional assistance to draft a
code, a revision of the ALI's model, with a view to ultimate legisla-
tive enactment; one member dissented. Problems of jurisdiction gave
rise to delay, but two years later, in 1947, the sum of $500 was appro-
priated as an honorarium for the draftsman and work got under way.
The project was short lived. Within a year work had stopped
and debate was resumed; once again the question was whether or not
a code was desirable after all. The special committee appointed to
study the problem this time split four to three in favoring continued
effort on a code.' By 1949 the pro's and con's were published 2 and
the stage was set for a full dress debate at the annual meeting of the
Association. That debate never took place. Commissioner Schnader,
at the last minute, rendered the subject moot with his announcement
that the Uniform Commissioners had undertaken the task.27 In any
event, both sides agreed, the Pennsylvania bar would have the oppor-
tunity to examine and evaluate a superseding effort.The anti-code position, however, remains of interest even though
it was the minority view, for it is a brief against any attempt to re-
duce the law of evidence to the confines of a statute or set of rules. The
major objection to a comprehensive formulation was that in a field
"as broad and as relative as Evidence" any code must, of necessity, be
too complex for ready use28 There is certainly force to the argument
in terms of the then available samples. No one has yet contended that
the Model Code was simple and the tentative draft of a Pennsylvania
version produced in 1947-48 seems to have been little improvement.
The latter, wrote the dissenters, contains "over three hundred para-
23. Windolph, A Code of Evidence for Pennsylvania-Pro, 20 PA. B.A.Q. 214,
216-17 (1949).
24. Id. at 216.
25. Majority Report, 20 PA. B.A.Q. 283 (1949) ; Minority Report, id. at 284.
26. Windolph, supra note 23; Wingerd, Rhoads and MacElree, A Code of Evi-
detwe-Cmara, id. at 220 (the authors being the minority members of the special
committee).
27. 55 ANNUAL REP. PA. BAL Ass'x (54th Annual Meeting) 27, 121-22 (1949).
28. Wingerd, Rhoads and MacElree, supra note 26 at 221, 222.
6 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103
graphs and sub-paragraphs. Many of these rules are interlocking, that
is, they contain cross references of exceptions to inclusions and provi-
sions found in other rules," and the random samples cited in support
begin with a subsection which "refers to sixty-five other provisions." 29
This was not the worst. Going back a few years one would find that
Wigmore's "pocket code" ran some 500 pages.30
But there are more techniques than one in the drafting of statutes.
Wigmore strenuously urged upon the American Law Institute the
continued use of a lengthy, complex listing of all conceivable situa-
tions3' He redrafted a simple ten line rule on qualification of wit-
nesses so that it ran five times that length and included in its text ref-
erence to "theodolite, chemical reagents, X-ray machine, etc." as well
as "statistical sources of prices, products, [and] deliveries." 32 But the
Institute would have none of this and its product marked an advance
toward simplicity.
Further advance toward a readily usable set of rules was still to be
achieved. It is true that the short-lived attempt at a Pennsylvania
version made no progress toward simplification. This, however, is not
surprising for the practical limitations imposed by the appropriation,
no less than the terms of the original authorization to proceed with a
draft, tied the end product fairly close to the prototype. When one
considers that the Pennsylvania legislature has appropriated $190,000
for the work of the Procedural Rules Committee,33 that the American
Law Institute began work on its evidence project with a $40,000 grant,
and that ultimately it took the editorial committee of the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws four years to accomplish the precise
task which Pennsylvania sought to do on $500 of professional assist-
ance, it is understandable that substantial change was hard to come by.
Study of the new Uniform Rules reveals that substantial change has
now been achieved. The draftsmen set out "to avoid or materially re-
duce burdensome cross references," "to achieve further simplicity of
expression" -and they have succeeded to a remarkable degree.
29. Id. at 222.
30. WIGMORE, POCMT CODE OF THE RuLEs OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT LAW
(1910, 2d ed. 1935).
3f. Statement by John H. Wigmore, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 111-12 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1940).
32. Id. at 112-14.
33. See Graubart, Rejoinder from Pennsylvania, 101 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 959
(1953).
34. Address of Judge Gard, chairman of the drafting committee, before Evidence
Roundtable of Association of American Law Schools at Chicago, Ill., Dec. 28, 1953
quoted in Falknor, 1953 Annual Survey of Awwrican Law, Evidenwe, 29 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 953, 986 (1954).
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In other respects, too, the Rules represent a considered attempt to
meet many, if not all, of the articulated objections to the Model Code.
In the words of Judge Spencer A. Gard, chairman of the drafting
committee, the Rules aim "to capitalize on the prestige of the Model
Code of Evidence" but "to give it more of the slant of the practicing
lawyer and the judge on the bench" and "most important of all, to over-
come the rather strenuous opposition in many quarters to the Model
Code's liberality, by the simple expediency of being less liberal." "
In sum, then, working with the earlier Institute effort as a base
and with a committee of the Institute actively cooperating, the Uniform
Commissioners have drafted a new proposal. The changes which have
been made are certainly deserving of careful analysis. No less should
be accorded those provisions which, having survived without change,
are presented to the profession with the added force of independent
concurrence and the added prestige of as practical and successful an
agency as the National Conference on Uniform State Laws.
STRUCTURE AND METHOD
Herein of Retevance
Structurally the Rules are simple enough. A few preliminaries
aside, they open with a general abolition of "all disqualifications of wit-
nesses, privileges and limitations on the admissibility of relevant evi-
dence." " In the words of the comment, Rule 7 "wipes the slate clean."
But all the learning of yesteryear is not thus summarily discarded. The
rule but expresses Thayer's conception that relevant evidence should
be "prima facie admissible unless limitations are imposed by another
rule." 17 And "other rules" in abundance are included in the eight suc-
ceeding chapters, respectively entitled Judicial Notice, Presumptions,
Witnesses, Privileges, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, Ex-
pert and Other Opinion Testimony, Hearsay Evidence, and Authenti-
cation and Contents of Writings.
Thus, however broad Rule 7 may appear, its actual impact cannot
be assessed without examination of the rules which follow and the lim-
itations which they include. In some instances, notably in the area of
privilege, the new limitations are broader and hence more restrictive of
admissibility than under existing Pennsylvania law. In at least one
instance, however, the breadth of Rule 7 does effect significant
35. Ibid.; see also Gard, Kansas Law and the New Uniform Rules of Evidence,
2 KAN. L. REv. 333, 339 (1954).
36. UmnFoRm RuLEs OF EVIENCE, Rule 7, comment (1953), hereinafter cited
URE.
37. Ibid.
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change. The restrictions of the so-called Dead Man Statutes are not
reintroduced; hence, they are abolished.
A final word on the method of the draftsmen before considering
the details of a few of the more significant provisions of the Uniform
Rules. The Commissioners made no attempt to treat constitutional
issues. They frankly recognize that a rule of admissibility may be ren-
dered inoperative in a given situation by the requirements of due
process or by application of some other constitutional provision.38
Users of the Rules are simply put on notice that resort must be had
to other sources of the law in this important, developing area.39 Sim-
ilarly, the draftsmen recognized that evidentiary precedents will con-
tinue of major importance in delineating details of the law. Instance
the matter of relevance. About half of the nine volumes of Wigmore,
suggests Judge Gard, are devoted to the problems of relevancy-to
applying the rules to the particular fact situations presented by a myriad
of cases.' The Rules would have none of that. "The only test of
relevance is logic. With this simple statement we must be content.
Nothing could be gained in a code of rules by making it a thesis on
the subject of logic. The courts will have to continue to decide what
inferences might reasonably be drawn. . ." ' The black-letter
definition is, accordingly, confined to the statement that " 'Relevant
evidence' means evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any
material fact," 42 a welcome relief from Wigmore's complicated con-
coction 43 of which Professor Chadbourn wrote "This is certainly no
dish of pabulum.""
DEAD MAN STATUTES
At least since 1927 these surviving relics of the earlier concep-
tion that interest renders a witness incompetent have been under heavy
and sustained attack. Judges, lawyers and academicians condemned
the legislative assumption that every witness, however slight his inter-
est, must be "presumed to be incapable of resisting the temptation to
perjury; and every judge and juryman [must be] presumed to be
38. URE Prefatory Note 5; Rule 7, comment.
39. Privilege against self-incrimination is treated, Rules 23-25. Even here the
draftsmen state "Constitutional immunities cannot, of course, be affected by this
rule." Rule 23(3), comment. It is also true that judicial decision serves as the
basis for the privilege in a very few jurisdictions. Rule 23(1), comment.
40. Gard, supra note 16 at 46.
41. Rule 1(2), comment.
42. Rule 1 (2).
43. ". . . the evidentiary fact will be considered when, and only when, the de-
sired conclusion based upon it is a more probable or natural, or at least a probable
or natural, hypothesis, and when the other hypotheses or explanations of the fact,
if any, are either less probable or natural, or at least not exceedingly more probable
or natural." 1 WiGmom 421 (3d ed. 1940).
44. Chadbourn, .mpra note 12, at p. 8, col. 4.
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incapable of discerning perjury committed under circumstances
peculiarly calculated to excite suspicion and watchfulness." " Solving
the problem of perjury with a rule of exclusion exacted a heavy price
from the honest litigant, and who could say that litigants dishonest
enough to commit perjury would stop at suborning perjury? As has
already been noted, Rule 7 serves to abolish the Dead Man Statutes.
Furthermore, the Rules do not propose adoption of some untried
experiment. A long and successful history in England, Connecticut,
Massachusetts and elsewhere bespoke change, as did the American Bar
Association which considered the Dead Man Statutes a bar to minimal
standards of judicial administration." Dean William Green Hale of
the University of Southern California recalled these successes to the
bar of his own state and added a telling point which has since been
echoed by lawyers and judges in Pennsylvania.
"[I]t is difficult to understand [the] wholly one-sided con-
cern over the possible maintenance of an unfounded claim against
the deceased and no concern for the actual losses sustained under
these acts by survivors who find themselves unable to establish
their valid claims against an estate. There should be some tears
for the living as well as for the dead. I say this much on the
general problem involved without' pausing to point out the utter
hodge podge of illogicalness embraced by our own particular form
of Dead Man's Statute." 
47
Comment has not been lacking on some of Pennsylvania's own
particular brand of shocking, albeit entirely correct, results 48 and two
years ago the State Bar Association recommended reform in this area. 9
45. MORGAN ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENcE-SoME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFOmI
25 (1927) quoting from the second report of the English Common Law Practice
Commissioners (1853) and to the same effect from the 1848 report of the New York
Commissioners on Practice and Pleading. See also the discussion at 34-35.
46. VANDERBILT, MINIM£UM STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION 334 et Seq.
(1949) ; MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 45 at 27-30; Hale, in PROCEEDINGS, FOURTEENTH
ANNUAL MEETINGS, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 153, 156 (1941).
47. Hale, in op. cit. supra note 46, at 157.
48. Windolph, supra note 23 at 218 discussing Lockard v. Vare, 230 Pa. 591, 79
Ati. 802 (1911).
49. 58 ANNUAL REP. PA. BAR Ass'x (57th Annual Meeting) 38-39 (1952).
House Bill No. 1450, Session of 1953, drafted to effectuate this recommendation, died
in committee. HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS 159 (Final Issue,
Session of 1953). For the history and plans for future action with respect to im-
plementation see McWilliams, Judicial Administration, 24 PA. B.A.Q. 166, 170-71,
179 (1953) and Ervin, Report of Committee on Judicial Administration, 25 PA.
B.A.Q. 372, 373 (1954).
"To offset the disadvantages to the estate from the unavailability of the de-
cedent, statements made by him relating to the transaction would be admissible under
an exception to Rule 63, the hearsay rule." Gard, supra note 35, at 348. The
recommendations of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, supra, also insure such
safeguards.
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PRESUMPTIONS
Pennsylvania was early in the forefront of the attempt to treat
presumptions in an intelligent, intelligible manner. This is no mean
feat in an area which remains so consistently perplexing that some
commentators even doubt the Pennsylvania rule to be law in Penn-
sylvania."° Yet the view to which this state has lent its name, although
a minority approach, has persevered to become the basis for what the
Uniform Commissioners now propose, a solution which gives prom-
ise of being at once practicable and acceptable.
A slippery word, presumption has been used with a variety of
meanings.51 Reams have been devoted to explaining that the presump-
tion of innocence in criminal cases is no presumption at all, but an inde-
pendent rule of criminal procedure masquerading under an assumed
name.52 With even greater emphasis, text writers and judges have
explained that the conclusive or irrebutable presumption is neither kith
nor kin of the true variety, but rather a rule of substantive law.53 For-
tunately, there is virtually no controversy over the burden of proof in
the particular case involving the presumption of innocence " and liti-
gants do not seriously attempt to refute the irrefutable. Hence the
Uniform Rules wisely avoid these semantic disputes. 5 Without sac-
rificing either analysis or clarity, the Commissioners have so drafted
the provisions governing the effect to be given presumptions that the
basic agreement over what shall be done is adequately expressed and
50. Quoting a discussion of presumption law which referred to "the Pennsylvania
rule," Morgan felt impelled to note his doubt as to "whether Pennsylvania still re-
tains this rule." Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HAxv. L. REv. 481,
497 n.38 (1946). See also id. at 500; MORGAN AND MAGUIRE, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON EVIDENcE 113 (3d ed. 1951); MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE-COMMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAW 187 (1947): "Of late the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has had
an access of orthodoxy on the topic, but its decisions trying to harmonize the old and
the new dispensations are not too simple or clear." See also Note, ThW Effect of
Rebuttable Presumptions in Pennsylvania, 57 DICK. L. REv. 234 (1953).
51. 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 30-31 (1954); MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE, c. 8, Introductory Note at 306-09 (1942).
52. MAGUIRE, op. cit. supra note 50, at 191-192; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENdE §2511
(3d ed. 1940).
53. See, e.g., 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2492 (3d ed. 1940).
54. There has been dispute over the language to be used in charging the jury
in the criminal case, particularly on the question of whether the "presumption" is or
is not "evidence." See authorities cited note 52 supra; LADD, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 753-54 (1949). In civil cases there frequently is a genuine
presumption of innocence of such crime as arson, bigamy, etc. Compare URE
Rule 15, comment, with Rule 16, comment.
55. The definition of a presumption (Rule 13) can be read to include conclusive
presumptions, but the text of Rule 14 on "Effect of Presumptions" specifically excepts
the "conclusive or irrefutable" variety. Similarly, see the comment to Rule 16 dis-
cussing the presumption of innocence in criminal cases: "But for those who may
look upon it as a presumption within the meaning of these rules . . . it may
furnish assurance that the presumption of innocence is not intended to be disturbed."
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the Model Code's multi-paged introduction on varying uses of the diffi-
cult word is avoided.
Of importance is the distinction between an inference and a pre-
sumption. The drawing of permissible inferences from proof of fact
A to a finding of fact B is a problem in logic and need not concern us
here. "A presumption," Rule 13 informs us, "is an assumption of
fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed
from another fact or group of facts. ... " ' Or, as Professor Morgan
has phrased it, presumption "means that when A is established, the
trier of the fact must assume that B exists unless or until a specified
condition has been fulfilled." 57 Any one of a thousand scraps of evi-
dence may lead a judge or jury to infer, or refuse to infer, that Jones
has died; it is only when the law says that proof of unexplained absence
for a period of seven years requires the assumption of Jones' death that
a presumption enters the picture.
8
Defining presumptions is relatively a simple task compared to de-
ciding what to do with one after it has been identified. The major
source of difficulty which has bedeviled the law and given rise to a
plethora of competing doctrine is the fact that in some cases the basic
facts which give rise to a presumption have a great deal of probative
value as evidence of the existence of the presumed fact, while others
have little. 9 This makes sense when one recognizes that in some cases
the presumption is intended for little more than procedural convenience,
or as a device to cast the burden of producing evidence on the party
with more ready access to the proof, while in other situations pre-
sumptions are invoked because they represent conclusions "firmly
based upon the generally known results of wide human experience" 60
and, in the particular instance being litigated, it is not likely that any-
one can adduce proof of what had occurred. To give too little effect to
the latter type or too great an effect to one of the former types would
lead to unhappy results.
The need for a measure of flexibility seems apparent, and yet
an attempt to classify presumptions, assigning to each a procedural
56. Italics added.
57. Morgan, Presumptions: Their Nature, Purpose and Reason 3-4 (1949) in 2
BRANiDEIS LAWYERS' SocIETY, ADRESSES.
58. 9 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §2491 (3d ed. 1940) points out that the term
"presumption of fact" as distinguished from "presumption of law" is often used to
mean "inference" and causes confusion, for which reason Wigmore concludes that the
term "presumption of fact" should be discarded. Compare 2 HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA
EVIDENCE § 651 (1953). For a discriminating exposition of how the term "presump-
tion of fact" is properly used see Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 315 Pa. 497,
500-01, 512, 173 AtI. 644, 646-47, 651 (1934).
59. See MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 51, at 31-32.
60. Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 315 Pa. 497, 504, 173 Atl. 644, 648
(1934).
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effect commensurate with the strength of the reasons which induced its
creation, has been termed an almost impossible task, a cure worse than
the disease, and a solution more rational, but less to be preferred than
that offered by a simple rule." The tradition has been to favor a one-
rule world,62 although what that rule shall be is the subject of contin-
uing dispute.
The classic approach of Thayer and Wigmore gave relatively little
effect to presumptions; it merely placed a burden of going forward
with contradicting evidence on the party against whom the presump-
tion operated. The risk of non-persuasion did not shift, the burden of
convincing the trier of the fact would remain on the party in whose
favor the presumption ran if it was his without the presumption." Add
only a rule that the jury need not even be informed of the existence of
the presumption, and the impact is small indeed. As the Supreme
Court of Oregon has so graphically described this view:
"when evidence is introduced to rebut the presumption-however
weak the evidence may be 6 4 -the presumption is overcome and
destroyed. Some text-writers, law professors, and judges who
have espoused the Wigmore doctrine have vied with one another
in an effort to show how flimsy and unsubstantial a presumption
of law really is. This 'phantom of the law' has been likened to
bats 'flitting about in the twilight and then disappearing in the
sunshine of actual facts,' and to a house of cards that topples over
when rebutted by evidence. It remained for Professor Bohlen
to head the class when he said a presumption of law was like
Maeterlinck's male bee which, after functioning, disappeared." 66
The Pennsylvania Decisions
Pennsylvania had long held that a presumption was more than a
bat or a bee. It was given the effect of shifting not only the burden
of coming forward with evidence, but of shifting the risk of non-
persuasion as well; if the trier of the fact be undecided let the decision
be in favor of the existence of the presumed fact.66
61. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, C. 8, Introductory Note at 312 (1942).
62. See discussion in Gausewitz, Premmptioxs in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND.
L. REv. 324 (1952).
63. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 336, 339 (1898); 9 WIG-
moRE, EVIDENCE § 2487 (3d ed. 1940).
64. Cf. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 704 (1942) where the quantum is ex-
pressed as evidence which would support a finding of the non-existence of the
presumed fact.
65. Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 173 Ore. 592, 597, 147 P.2d 227,
229-30 (1944).
66. Doud v. Hines, 269 Pa. 182, 112 Atl. 528 (1921) (presumption of negligence).
"It is difficult to see how a presumption could be successfully rebutted except by a
preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 185, 112 AtI. at 529; Holzheimer v. Lit
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Then came Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co. 17 Plaintiff sued
on an accidental death policy. His was the burden of proving that the
carbon monoxide poisoning from which the insured had died was acci-
dental, and he invoked the presumption against suicide to come to his
aid. The trial court charged that the presumption "has the same pro-
bative force and effect as direct evidence of accidental death" and that
unless "the jury find that the evidence of the defendant outweighs the
presumption . . . the verdict must be for the plaintiff." 6 The verdict
was for the plaintiff and the supreme court reversed. Confusion in
Pennsylvania law is alleged to have resulted.
Yet Mr. Justice Maxey's erudite discussion and, more particularly,
the holding on the particular facts before him seem eminently sensible
when read against the background of the period. That the suicide rate
rises in periods of economic depression is well known. Less well
known yet highly relevant is the fact that "[a] sphyxiation by carbon
monoxide accounts for about 25%o of all suicides, and is the method of
choice in urban centers" so that proof of death by this means "will
usually stir the insurer to intensify a search for other extrinsic suicide
evidence." 6 Whatever the basis for a presumption against suicide in
other situations, was there not reason for asserting that, as applied in
Watkins, no "conclusion firmly based upon the generally known re-
sults of wide human experience" supported the assumption of acci-
dent ? 70
Brothers, 262 Pa. 150, 105 Atl. 73 (1918) (presumption of agency); Vuille v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 42 Pa. Super. 567 (1910) (presumption of injury by last
carrier).
There are many cases which require submission to the jury of a disputed question
of fact, e.g., Francis v. Prudential Ins. Co., 243 Pa. 380, 90 Atl. 205 (1914) (presump-
tion of receipt of letter) and hence might be thought to show rejection of the Thayer
view. However, it is essential to note that even for Thayer a jury question might
arise as a result of the inference to be drawn from proof of the basic fact, and it is
rare that appellate opinions spell out precisely which party has the risk of non-
persuasion. Furthermore, in some cases which do appear to reject the Thayer view,
the decisions may be supported on the basis of an intermediate view, lying between
the complete shift of the burden of proof, known as the Pennsylvania rule, and
Thayer's "bursting bubble" theory. See discussion in text following note 87 infra.
This is particularly true in cases such as Williams v. Ludwig Floral Co., 252 Pa.
140, 97 At. 206 (1916), which emphasize that the credibility of the rebutting evidence
is for the jury and have no need or occasion to specify where the risk of persuasion
lies. All such cases, however, are consistent with the view that a presumption
shifts the risk of non-persuasion and the commentators so classified Pennsylvania.
See authorities cited supra note 50; Gausewitz, supra note 62, at 331.
Conmey v. Macfarlane, 97 Pa. 361 (1881) (presumption of consideration arising
from a negotiable instrument) is early authority for the Thayer view. It does not,
however, seem to have had any effect on presumption law in Pennsylvania. See
discussion in text following note 89 infra.
67. 315 Pa. 497, 173 Atl. 644 (1934).
68. Id. at 500, 173 AtI. at 646.
69. Richardson and Breyfogle, Problems of Proof it Distinguishing Suicide from
Accident, 56 YALE L.J. 482, 500 (1947).
70. It is noteworthy that the opinion goes into a statistical study of suicides
compared to fatal accidents and Mr. Justice Maxey concludes that "it might easily
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The Watkins case has been frequently cited on the effect to be
accorded presumptions, yet it seems indisputably clear that Mr. Justice
Maxey was holding that there was no presumption in the case which
could have any effect; "' there was only an inference which the jury
might, under appropriate instructions, choose or refuse to draw.72  Five
times the opinion refers to the "so-called 'presumption against sui-
cide' ", repeatedly asserting that it "is merely an inference or argu-
ment" and not a presumption binding until disproved. As though
there might yet be doubt, Mr. Justice Maxey, in a now-famous pas-
sage, proceeds to explain how presumptions arise, into what categories
they fall, how the categories may be illustrated, and finally to demon-
strate that the "so-called 'presumption against suicide' " is not of these:
"It is merely a permissible consideration of the non-probability of
death by suicide." 71
The case disposed of, Mr. Justice Maxey nevertheless felt im-
pelled to go further and explain that, in any event, presumptions are
not evidence and should not be spoken of as having the "same proba-
tive force and effect as direct evidence." 74 On this there is substantial
agreement even among those who disagree on other aspects of pre-
sumption law. But in the course of his extended treatment of these
and other facets of presumption doctrine, Mr. Justice Maxey quotes
copiously from Wigmore, a bat and bee man whose view Pennsylvania
had not theretofore accepted, and thus includes in his opinion citable
authority for the limited Thayer view." It is significant that the
Watkins opinion contains no serious evaluation of the procedural con-
sequences which might result from a genuine presumption. This lack
in what is otherwise an erudite, well-documented discussion lends fur-
happen in some years" that the number of suicides will exceed the number of fatal acci-
dents. 315 Pa. at 506, 173 Atl. at 649. The opinion (in the official report) also
italicizes "death by carbon monoxide poisoning." Id. at 504.
71. "The decision was that there was no presumption against suicide, but nothing
more than a justifiable inference. . . ." Morgan, supra note 57 at 16. See also
Note, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions in Penwsylvania, 57 Diciy. L. Rv.
234, 241 (1953) ; Bohlen, Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., PA. B.A.Q. No. 23,
p. 219 (1935). Compare Taintor, "Presumptions" in Pennsylvania, Part II, 17
PA. B.A.Q. 193, 195-96 (1946).
72. The opinion recognizes that the term "presumption of fact" has been used
as a synonym of inference, disapproves the usage and is careful to point out that
such "presumptions" are not presumptions at all. See discussion and authorities, note
58 supra.
73. 315 Pa. at 505, 173 Atl. at 648. Mr. Justice Maxey also discusses three main
causes of "confusion of thought and expression in the understanding and application
of this so-called 'presumption against suicide,'" the first of which is "the treating of
an ordinary permissible deduction as a compellable assumption, i.e., as a presump-
tion, putting on the person on whom it operates the burden of coming forward with
opposing evidence. . . ." Id. at 507, 173 Atl. at 649.
74. Id. at 513, 173 At. at 651.
75. Id. at 500-02, 173 Atl. at 646-47 and quoting Thayer at 503, 173 AtI. at
647-48.
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ther force to the conclusion that Mr. Justice Maxey had no intention
at that time of changing the Pennsylvania law as regards presumptions
generally.7" Whatever his intention, however, the opinion and its suc-
cessors put Pennsylvania squarely in the doubtful column.
The post-Watkins history has not been even. In 1942 the
superior court had before it a workmen's compensation statute 77 which
exonerated the employer in case of suicide, but which placed the "bur-
den of proof of such fact" upon him. The court found this provision
"merely a recognition and declaration of the legal 'presumption' against
suicide," and, most remarkably, cited Watkins as authority. 7 A year
later Watkins was cited more accurately and, more significantly, by
Maxey himself, now Chief Justice. Speaking for a unanimous court,
he held that "an even balancing of the evidence on the issue of death
by accidental means, or death by suicide, denotes that plaintiff failed
to sustain his burden of proof." 7' The jury had found for plaintiff,
but judgment on the verdict was reversed and entered for defendant.
It is not surprising to find no discussion of a presumption against
suicide, for Watkins had held there was none, but gone, too, is any
consideration of the inference against suicide.8" Even evidence of the
76. One year earlier Mr. Justice Maxey, discussing the presumption of due care
on the part of a deceased, bad said: "We find no evidence in this case so concusively
overcoming that presumption as to justify the court below in declaring Morin negli-
gent as a matter of law." Morin v. Kreidt, 310 Pa. 90, 97, 164 Atl. 799, 801 (1933).
Certainly this was no attempt to follow a "bursting bubble," Thayer view of presump-
tions. For Mr. Justice Maxey's later views, see his treatment of presumptions in the
MacDonald case, discussed in text at note 92 infra.
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Purdon 1952).
78. Wellinger v. Brackenridge Borough, 149 Pa. Super. 394, 395-96, 27 A.2d
716, 717 (1942).
79. Waldron v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 347 Pa. 257, 31 A.2d 902 (1943).
The quotation, from the headnote, is taken with slight change from Watkins, and was
also included by Mr. Justice Maxey in Walters v. Western & Southern Life Ins.
Co., 318 Pa. 382, 388, 178 At. 499, 501 (1935). The opinion in Walters is an
emphatic reiteration of Watkins. The supreme court, however, affirmed despite the
presence in the charge of sentences which, taken alone, would have constituted
reversible error and warned that the use of the word "presumption" in the manner
of the charge and as used by the superior court was not sanctioned. There is some
emphasis in the opinion on the fact that the trial court had acted before the opinion
in Watkins was handed down.
80. How strong such an inference must be to avail plaintiff is a difficult problem.
There is language that accident, rather than suicide, must be shown to be "the
reasonable and not a reasonable inference or probability", yet an analysis of the
factual situations adjudicated do not readily fall into a satisfactory pattern. Taintor,
supra note 71, at 195-97, discusses a number of the cases and concludes that since
Watkins "a presumption against suicide, or some other unidentified rule of law"
aids plaintiff in meeting this burden. Id. at 195. His argument is based, first, on
his conclusion that in certain cases "it cannot be said that 'accident' was the reason-
able inference: the most that can be said is that it was a reasonable inference."
Id. at 196. This, it is respectfully submitted, does no more than demonstrate the
inadequacy and perhaps inaccuracy of the "the-a" formula quoted above. Taintor
argues further in support of a post-Watkins presumption against suicide from the
cases which apply the workmen's compensation statutory assignment of the burden
of proof, a conclusion which is highly debatable.
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cheerful spirits of the deceased shortly before the event is given short
shrift with the comment that "In many cases suicide results from a sud-
den impulse. What motivates suicide," the court concludes in a phil-
osophical vein, "is often a mystery." 81
This holding is certainly debatable, but the debate will advance
our inquiry no further than to affirm or negate the desirability of a pre-
sumption against suicide in actions on this particular type of insurance
policy. It is the broader context of what to do about recognized pre-
sumptions and the legacy of Watkins in this area which is our primary
interest.
Language of all types abounds. A 1954 supreme court opinion
repeats, quite unnecessarily, the old shibboleth that the "burden of
proof" (as distinguished from the burden of going forward with the
evidence) never shifts,8 2 a palpably inaccurate statement which has been
at the root of the view that a presumption therefore cannot shift the
risk of non-persuasion.3 Lest this be thought to represent a devoted
return to Watkins it should perhaps be added that the opinion also
states that the "effect of the presumption is the same as though direct
evidence of payment had been introduced." " Because appellate
opinions have their primary impact, if not function, in cases other
than the one whose caption they carry, because they are studied with
such thoroughness by bench and bar and constitute authority for what
they say as well as for what they do," there is utility in commenting
even on the language of an appellate court, particularly one so highly
regarded. Yet it is the holdings which must engage our major atten-
tion. These reveal that certain presumptions continue to shift the risk
of non-persuasion in Pennsylvania."6
81. Waldron v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 347 Pa. 257, 261, 31 A.2d 902, 904.
82. Schmidt v. Paul, 377 Pa. 377, 381, 105 A.2d 118, 120 (1954). See 9 WIGMORE,
EviDENCE § 2489 (3d ed. 1940).
83. See, e.g., discussion of this "troublesome cabala or mystic doctrine" in
MAGUIRE, op. cit. supra note 50 at 177, 186-87. Where a presumption of legitimacy
is involved it seems clear that the risk of non-persuasion shifts, to instance but one
indisputable situation. For a discussion of Thayer's analysis of such cases, see
Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WAsH. L. REv. 255, 278 (1937).
84. Schmidt v. Paul, 377 Pa. 377, 382, 105 A.2d 118, 121.
85. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 68 (1951 ed.) discusses the use of a court's
language, even "dicta which are grandly obiter" as authority, and concludes such use
to be "recognized, legitimate, honorable."
86. Corn v. Wilson, 365 Pa. 355, 75 A.2d 530 (1950) (presumption of payment);
Grenet's Estate, 332 Pa. 111, 2 A.2d 707 (1938) ("The presumption of payment
arising from lapse of time . . . amounts to nothing more than a rule of evidence
which reverses the ordinary burden of proof and makes it incumbent upon the
creditor to prove,' by preponderance of the evidence, that the debt was not actually
paid." Id. at 113, 2 A.2d at 707-08) ; Obici Estate, 373 Pa. 567, 97 A.2d 49
(1953) (presumption of continuing domicile with indications in the opinion that the
quantum of proof necessary to rebut may even be more than beyond a reasonable
doubt); McNulty v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 153 Pa. Super. 288, 33 A.2d 796
(1943) (presumption of death after seven years absence; non-jury case which ap-
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There are, however, Pennsylvania cases which treat certain pre-
sumptions as of the Thayer variety. 7 Yet even these did not follow
Thayer all the way. For Thayer the introduction of rebutting evidence,
without more, would cause the presumption to vanish. The burden of
going forward having been met, the purpose of the presumption was
parently shifts total burden). As was pointed out in note 66 supra, it is often
difficult to determine from a reading of the cases whether or not the risk of non-
persuasion has been shifted, and no doubt in many of them there is no need for the
court to meet so refined a point. Sefton v. Valley Dairy Co., 345 Pa. 324, 28 A.2d
313 (1942) (presumption of agency) is one of many cases entirely consistent with
what is known as the Pennsylvania rule and cites with approval earlier authority
(Holzheimer v. Lit Bros., supra note 66) which clearly applied that rule. Hence it
is more than probable that such cases represent the shifted-burden view, although they
are also consistent with other views discussed in the text at note 91 infra.
Instance, too, District of Columbia's Appeal, 343 Pa. 65, 21 A2d 883 (1941)
(presumption of parentage arising from presence of the child in the household at an
early age). The court states without equivocation: "We hold that the presumption
here involved may be rebutted by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence."
Id. at 77, 21 A.2d at 889. Yet earlier the opinion cites with approval not only
Watkins but a Vermont opinion which was influenced by Watkins to adopt the
Thayer position and, further, quotes from Wigmore to the effect that the presump-
tion has vanished on the introduction of rebutting evidence "because its function
was as a legal rule . . . to cast upon the opponent the duty of producing evidence,
and this duty and this legal rule he has satisfied." Id. at 75-76, 21 A.2d at 889.
Perhaps the key to the apparent difficulties lies in the assumption of the court that
one side or the other will have persuaded the trier of the fact on the actual evidence
and, in the absence of a jury to be charged, no consideration need be given to who
prevails if the trier is undecided. Says the court: "It cannot be doubted that when
all the evidence was presented in this case the presumption had been sufficiently
rebutted and that it became necessary to weigh the evidence on both sides for the
purpose of ascertaining where the preponderance lay." Id. at 76, 21 A.2d at 889.
87. MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944) (pre-
sumption of negligence, discussed in the text at note 92 infra); Schell v. Miller
North Broad Storage Co., 142 Pa. Super. 293, 16 A.2d 680 (1940) (presumption
of liability-creating conduct by bailee, discussed in the text at note 127 infra);
Henes v. McGovern, 317 Pa. 302, 176 Atl. 503 (1935) (presumption against a gift).
The opinion by Justice Maxey in the last mentioned case places a great deal of
emphasis on the fact that only the burden of going forward is shifted by a presumption
and after pointing out that credibility of the rebutting witnesses is for the jury,
concludes that the jury has apparently not believed them. This analysis is in accord
with the discussion in the text at note 91 infra. It is doubtful, however, that the
holding would have been any different if the risk of non-persuasion had been held
to have been shifted. Geho's Estate, 340 Pa. 412, 17 A.2d 342 (1941) (presumption
of validity of a will) follows the Thayer analysis, but on its facts represents no more
than a holding that there was insufficient rebutting evidence.
The procedural effect of the presumption of negligence (MacDonald v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., supra) is not altogether free from doubt. After Watkins and before
MacDonald the supreme court decided Norris v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 334 Pa.
161, 5 A.2d 114 (1939) in which they held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
not applicable on the facts of that case. The court was persuaded to hold res ipsa
inapplicable because the presumption of negligence to which it gives rise was "so
strong," having the effect of placing on the defendant the "duty to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the accident occurred notwithstanding his exercise
of care." Id. at 163, 5 A.2d at 115. Archer v. Pittsburgh Ry., 349 Pa. 547, 37 A.2d
539 (1944), decided only a few months after MacDonald, has been cited to the
effect that the presumption of negligence shifts the "burden of persuasion." BROWN,
PENNSYLVANIA EViDENCE 1 (1949). The case is not altogether free from ambiguity,
as it might well be concerned with no more than the burden of going forward. See
general discussion in Forrest, Trend of Applicationt of the Doctrines of Res Ipsa
Loquitur and Exclusive Control in Pennsylvania, 58 DIcK. L. REv. 363, 367-68
(1954). See also Note, 57 DICK. L. Rr-v. 234, 243 (1953) which concludes with the
certainty of "doubt as to the effect of the presumption of negligence in Pennsylvania
res ipsa loquitur cases."
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accomplished and at that point it disappeared. This, too, was the
Model Code position."" No matter how lacking in trustworthiness the
rebutting witnesses were, the presumption vanished on the introduction
of their testimony.89  Not so in Pennsylvania. Cases which quoted
Thayer and purported to follow him required more than the presence
of rebutting evidence on the record. It was for the jury to believe or
disbelieve evidence so introduced before a presumption might be dissi-
pated. Could anything less, asks a recent commentator, be reconciled
with the fundamental concept of the "bipartite constitution of the com-
mon law tribunal"? 9 In effect, even while following Thayer, Penn-
sylvania accepted the modification of Professor Bohlen who had long
before argued that "[i]t is the duty of him against whom any pre-
sumption operates to produce evidence, not merely witnesses, and there-
fore he must satisfy the jury of the credibility of his witnesses." "
Let MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R."2 serve .as illustration
Plaintiff administrator proved no more than that decedent was killed
while a passenger in defendant's wrecked railroad car. This raised
a presumption of negligence. Defendant introduced evidence tending
to show sabotage and not negligence, evidence "of such a convincing
character" that a verdict of no liability was "clearly called for." 93
Under the Thayer view the presumption having been dissipated and
there being insufficient evidence to support a verdict for plaintiff,
9 4
judgment n. o. v. would be in order. This the lower court entered,
only to be reversed: it is for the jury to believe or disbelieve the evi-
dence of sabotage unless (1) it consists of incontrovertible physical
facts or (2) comes from a witness of the plaintiff whose testimony
is binding upon him.
In theory, as evidenced by the carefully selected language of the
opinion, MacDonald is straight Thayer except for the "independent"
problem of the jury's right to pass on the credibility of a witness, an
area in which Pennsylvania doctrine of long standing has been
88. MODEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 704 (1942).
89. MAGUrE, op. cit. supra note 50, at 189 et seq.
90. Note, 57 DICK. L. REv. 234, 237 (1953). The terminology is Wigmore's,
quoted in MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 564, 36 A.2d 492, 495
(1944).
91. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of
Proof, 68 U. oF PA. L. REv. 307, 315 n.13 (italics added).
92. 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944).
93. Id. at 563, 36 A.2d at 495.
94. Morgan, supra note 57, at 17, discussing the MacDonald case suggests that
"the result might possibly be explained by arguing that a derailment of a passenger
car carrying passengers on a regular route and schedule justifies an inference of
negligence, but I believe this was not what Mr. Chief Justice Maxey intended to
hold." Cf. Rennekamp v. Blair, 375 Pa. 620, 101 A.2d 669 (1954), discussed in
Forrest, supra note 87, at 364. Also see discussion of collected authorities in Note,
The Inference of Negligence in Pennsylvania, 24 TEMP. L.Q. 453, 454-55 (1951).
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stringent to prevent incursions by the judge." In theory, at least, this
is different from a determination that the risk of non-persuasion has
shifted to the defendant. Nor are differences in theory to be mini-
mized;" they can and do result in differences in practice. In some
cases plaintiff will not be able to reach the jury.17  In others the charge
of the judge, informing the jury which side must convince them in
95. Two of the leading cases are Hartig v. American Ice Co., 290 Pa. 21, 137
Atl. 867 (1927) (opinion by Mr. Chief Justice von Moschzisker) and Nanty-Glo
Boro v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 Ati. 523 (1932) (Mr. justice Schaffer
dissenting, as he did in Harlig). The latter case does not involve presumptions at
all and both are typical of many pre-Watkihs decisions on the credibility problem.
96. Morgan, in his recent, pithy text, presents eight separate positions to range
the gamut from pristine Thayer to the "Pennsylvania rule." 1 MORGAN, Op. Cit.
supra note 51, at 33-35.
97. A Pennsylvania litigant is bound by uncontradicted testimony introduced by
him, even that of a witness called as on cross-examination, Scacchi v. Montgomery,
365 Pa. 377, 75 A2d 535 (1950), so long as the trial judge does not find it in-
credible, or it is otherwise inherently improbable, Matthews v. Derencin, 360 Pa.
349, 62 A.2d 6 (1948); Marach v. Kooistra, 329 Pa. 324, 198 Atl. 66 (1938).
Where such evidence conclusively rebuts a presumption, as for example, that of
agency, nothing remains for submission to the jury regardless of which theory
of presumptions applies. Kunkel v. Vogt, 354 Pa. 279, 47 A.2d 195 (1946) (al-
ternative holding, opinion by Stern, J.) Instance, however, the following situation:
plaintiff relies on the presumption of agency arising from defendant's name on a
commercial vehicle. A witness for plaintiff, called as on cross-examination testifies
that (1) the driver in question was under orders not to use the truck on Sundays
(the accident having occurred on a Sunday) except for emergency situations and
(2) that he, the witness, heard of no such emergency on the day in question, although
he probably would have learned of one had it occurred. No question of credibility
is involved. Following Thayer, there would seem to be no question for submission
to the jury; defendant must prevail. Sufficient evidence has been introduced to sup-
port a finding for defendant, the presumption is thus dissipated, and there would
seem to be insufficient strength from the inference which might be drawn from the
basic fact to support a verdict for plaintiff, in view of all the testimony. If, however,
the burden of persuasion was on the defendant to disprove agency, it would seem
that the jury might well find that the testimony as to emergency, although sufficient
to support a verdict for defendant, did not satisfy this jury by a preponderance.
Cf. Readshaw v. Montgomery, 313 Pa. 206, 169 Atl. 135 (1933), questioned in BROwN,
op. cit. supra note 87, at 302. Instance another situation: plaintiff contracts with
defendant insurance company that "mysterious disappearance" of an article insured
under the theft policy in question would be presumed due to theft. Plaintiff's
evidence includes testimony from which the jury might legitimately infer non-felonious
loss of the article. Credibility not being involved, and sufficient evidence to support
a verdict for defendant having dissipated the presumption in Thayer's view, there
would seem to be nothing to submit to the jury, unless one took the doubtful position
that mere loss would create an inference of theft sufficient to sustain a verdict. Yet,
the risk of non-persuasion placed on defendant might well allow a jury to find that
the burden of establishing loss as distinguished from theft had not been met.
Cf. Sigel v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 434, 98 A.2d
376 (1953) where the court gave effect to the contractual provision discussed above,
but appeared to treat the presumption as only one "of fact," in the sense of inference,
despite its recognition that logically there was no inference. The trial court had
charged that the jury might presume theft while yet emphasizing that the burden of
proof was upon the plaintiff. Affirmance of an award of a new trial by the trial
court en banc is discussed in note 98 infra.
Various additional hypothetical situations may be put. In situations involving
presumptions of negligence, where the rebutting evidence tends to negate only one
of various types of possible negligence, it is important to consider whether such
evidence, even if believed, is broad enough to rebut the presumption, even under the
Thayer view. See discussion of the "extensity" of presumptions in MAGUIRE, op. cit.
supra note 50, at 184.
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order to win, has a crucial impact."' But the question remains: how
significant is the difference in practice between MacDonald and what
was long known as the Pennsylvania rule on presumptions? In most
cases, having cleared the hurdle of getting to the jury, litigants will not
be affected by the refinements. Wording a correct charge might have
been thought a snare and a trap, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has repeatedly gone out of its way to affirm, even in the presence of
incorrect charges on presumptions, if there is a basis for believing that
the jury was fairly presented with an opportunity of choosing between
the two versions of the dispute.9 Furthermore, competent judges have
been known to avoid altogether informing the jury of the burden of
persuasion in complicated presumption situations, preferring to state
only the alternatives which the triers may find if they choose to be-
lieve the version of one or the other of the litigants.",
Hence it seems fair to conclude that despite the vast amount of
alleged confusion in Pennsylvania law and the differences in theoretical
rationale between the various cases, in practice Pennsylvania's treat-
ment of recognized presumptions has not been radically altered since
pre-Watkins days.' 1
In describing the law that is, there remains to be mentioned a
further category of presumptions, those founded on a public policy so
strong that the law requires a measure of persuasion greater even than
a preponderance of the evidence to rebut them. The familiar presump-
tion against illegitimacy, for example, must be met with proof that is
not only clear, direct and satisfactory, but irrefragable as well.'
Effect.of the Uniform Rules
The Uniform Rules are much indebted to Pennsylvania law. The
bulk of cases which may be expected to come under Rule 14, "Effect of
98. Even a correct charge may so over-emphasize and stress the burden of proof
as to induce the lower court to grant a new trial because the jury may have been
misled. In Sigel v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 434,
98 A.2d 376 (1953) award of a new trial in such circumstances was affirmed. The
verdict in De Reeder v. Travelers Ins. Co., 329 Pa. 328, 198 Ati. 45 (1938) is
understandable in terms of a strong charge. See MoRRIs, ToRTs 138 (1953) where,
discussing the charge on allotment of burdens, the author concludes: "Unfortunately
the fate of litigants may turn on such jury charges; laymen are skeptical about the
value of circumstantial evidence and instructions on who has burden of conviction
may prove crucial."
99. Walter v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 318 Pa. 382, 178 At!. 499 (1935);
Wainstein v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 318 Pa. 428, 178 At. 502 (1935) ; Wright
v. Straessley, 321 Pa. 1, 182 At!. 682 (1936) (charge in error on shifting burden
of persuasion) ; cfi. enes v. McGovern, 317 Pa. 302, 176 Atl. 503 (1935). But see
discussion of the Walters case in note 79 supra.
100. See the discussion in the text at notes 132-43 infra on the use of the term
presumption in charging the jury.
101. Morgan, supra note 57, at 18-19.
102. Kerwin's Estate, 371 Pa. 147, 89 A.2d 332 (1952) (reviewing the au-
thorities). But cf. Cairgle v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 366
Pa. 249, 77 A.2d 439 (1951), noted in 25 Tiem. L.Q. 96 (1951).
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Presumptions," will be decided in accordance with what was so long
referred to as the Pennsylvania rule. The Uniform Rules do attempt,
and to a great degree achieve, a balance between flexibility and cer-
tainty, allowing for differences in the treatment of different types of
presumptions, yet preventing that total loss of predictability and cer-
tainty which would make the Rules impossible.
Specifically, they provide that, if the basic fact has probative value
as evidence of the fact to be presumed, the burden of establishing the
non-existence of the presumed fact is then on the litigant against whom
the presumption operates-in short, the burden of proof, in the broader
sense, is shifted. 03 If, however, the presumption is one of the compara-
tively few in which the basic fact would not be evidence of the pre-
sumed fact, the presumption shifts no more than the burden of going
forward with the evidence: rebutting evidence having been introduced,
the presumption disappears." 4 Finally, if the presumption is one
which, by rule of law, may be overcome only by proof beyond a reason-
able doubt or by clear and convincing evidence or by some other quan-
tum greater than a mere preponderance, then the burden of producing
that measure of proof is on the litigant against whom the presumption
operates.' - 5
A corollary and immediate advantage of the Rules described above
is to be found in the provision governing inconsistent presumptions.
The Model Code stated simply that they cancelled each other,.06 a
result which followed logically from its espousal of the Thayer posi-
tion. The desirability of that conclusion may, however, be questioned.
Instance the case of the woman whose husband had been missing for
less than seven years, long enough to induce her to marry another,
yet not long enough for the law to presume death. Is she, years later, to
be denied status as a widow of her second spouse because of a lack of
capacity at the time of the second marriage? The New Jersey court
held in the negative.'07 Analyzing the problem as a conflict between
the presumption of the continued existence of husband number one
and the presumption of innocence which would validate the common
103. URE Rule 14(a). See Rule 1(4) for definition of "Burden of Proof" as
used in the Rules.
104. URE Rule 14(b).
105. URE Rule 16.
106. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 704(2) (1942).
107. Silart v. Standard Screen Co., 119 N.J.L. 143, 194 Atl. 787 (1937) (work-
men's compensation case). See TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EViDEN E 42-43
(1952). The rule is frequently expressed in terms which refer to "a later ceremonial
marriage," Doertch v. Folwell Engineering Co., 252 Mich. 76, 233 N.W. 211 (1930) ;
1 MORGAN, op. cit. mtpra note 51, at 36. It is not significant, for purpose of this
discussion and the use of Sillart as illustration, to determine whether a ceremony
would be essential to the result in Pennsylvania.
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law marriage to spouse number two, the opinion finds the latter pre-
sumption based on a public policy sufficient to outweigh the former.
This is the approach of Uniform Rule 15 which provides that the judge
shall apply that presumption which is "founded on the weightier con-
siderations of policy and logic." If no such considerations are present,
then both presumptions shall be disregarded. With this approach
Pennsylvania appears to be in accord.' 08
In attempting to assess the impact which adoption of the Uniform
Rules would have in Pennsylvania, we are met at the threshold with
the question of how the courts will categorize existing presumptions.
Which will be held to be based on facts which have "probative value
as evidence of the existence of the presumed fact" and which not? Ob-
viously, the categorization would be crucial under the proposed new
formula. The comment provided by the Uniform Commissioners is of
help in applying the standard: it makes clear that most presumptions
are to be considered as based, at least in part, on facts with probative
value." 9  These, of course, shift the risk of non-persuasion. Some,
such as the presumption that a letter mailed is received in due course,
or the presumption of payment, are clearly in this category. They may
be expected to raise no problems and to receive substantially identical
treatment under the new rules."' Others, such as the presumption of
negligence in certain of the railroad cases or the presumption that the
driver of a truck with defendant's name on it was within the scope of
his employment at the time of the accident, are not free from doubt."'
There are indications, however, that even these may appropriately be
considered as based in part on facts with probative value as evidence of
the fact to be presumed."' If so, then the treatment accorded them
108. Thewlis's Estate, 217 Pa. 307, 66 Atl. 519 (1907); see Beegle's Estate, 64
Pa. Super. 180 (1916).
109. "Nearly all presumptions are of this sort." URE Rule 14, comment.
110. Treatment would be identical where current law shifts the risk of non-
persuasion, Grenet's Estate, 332 Pa. 111, 2 A.2d 707 (1938) cited note 86 supra.
For discussion of the presumption of delivery of a letter mailed see note 66 supra. But
see Teitelbaum v. Board of Revision of Taxes, 65 D. & C. 619 (1947) for a review
of authorities on the scope of the presumption and on its effect. The case does recog-
nize that the presumption is "[f] ounded in common experience." Id. at 628. For prob-
lems in the scope of rebuttal, see Wagman v. Paradise Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 79 D. &
C. 72 (1951).
111. "Certainly it could hardly be seriously contended that the mere fact that
defendant's name was painted on a truck was the basis of a justifiable inference that
the driver at the time of the accident was defendant's servant acting in the scope of
his employment." MORGAN, supra note 57, at 17. Viewing the problem statistically,
and without any further evidence in the case, is this objection well taken? See note
112 infra.
112. See Mr. Justice Musmanno in Fullerton v. Motor Express, Inc., 375 Pa.
173, 176, 100 A.2d 73, 74 (1953) : "The most elementary rules of logic . . . demand
that the law" recognize the presumption of agency. The comment to Rule 14 in-
cludes this presumption among those which are based on a rational inference.
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under the Rules will either be identical with present law,1 13 or involve
changes of little significance, for, as was developed above, treating a
presumption as disappearing only after the jury has passed on the cred-
ibility of the rebuttal witnesses does not involve differences of far-
reaching consequence compared to the view which shifts the risk of non-
persuasion. Whatever changes may appear in the treatment of the
vast bulk of presumptions which do have the "probative value" re-
quired by Rule 14(a) will, at most, prove a simple price to pay for the
new simplicity which the Uniform Rules would introduce.
There may develop presumptions which would be categorized as
based on facts without "probative value." There have been instances
in the past of presumptions of convenience so clearly without inference
value, as, for example, a presumption of the first," 4 or last,"x5 carrier
having been negligent in the handling of goods. If the text of Rule
14(b) be followed, these will disappear "when evidence is introduced"
which would rebut them. Credibility of such evidence would not nec-
essarily go to the jury, so long as the judge found that such evidence
was sufficient to "support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed
fact," unless the text of the Rule were changed or "interpreted"
severely." 6
A further variable is deserving of attention. What a court will
choose to recognize as a presumption is neither immutable nor fixed.
On the contrary it is very much subject to change and, in attempting
to predict the effect the Uniform Rules, it is important to recognize that
the very adoption of new formulae may act as a stimulus. The pre-
sumption against suicide is an example. No doubt adoption of the
Uniform Rules would give rise to an attempt to have this presumption
recognized in the insurance cases inasmuch as the comment to Rule
14 refers to it as one of the common examples of a presumption based
on probability. This change would seem to be to the good, even
though "carbon monoxide in a depression" may cause occasional dif-
113. As in the case of a presumption which now shifts the risk of non-persuasion.
114. New York Cent. & H.R.R. v. Eby, 12 Atl. 482 (Pa. 1888).
115. Vuille v. Pennsylvania R.R., 42 Pa. Super. 567 (1910). This is now
governed by statutory provision, 24 Stat. 386 (1887), as amended, 54 Stat. 919
(1940), 49 U.S.C. §20(11) (1952). Consider, too, the earlier Pennsylvania treat-
ment of the presumption that a bailee had acted culpably if he was not able to return
the goods to his bailor-a presumption which the Pennsylvania court had labelled
as no more than a procedural expedient to force full disclosure of such information
as the bailee might have. See Schell v. Miller North Broad Storage Co., 142 Pa.
Super. 293, 303, 16 A.2d 680, 684 (1940). For discussion of the subsequent develop-
ment, see text at note 127 infra.
116. For discussion of constitutional problems raised by statutory presumptions
with too great a procedural effect on proof of basic facts without inference value
see Morgan, Tot v. United States: Conwtitutienzal Restrictiots on Statutory Presump-
tions, 56 HARv. L. Rxv. 1324 (1943) and for treatment of Pennsylvania authority
see Taintor, supra note 71, at 195 and n.27, 197.
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ficulty. Certainly some of the cases discussed earlier 117 appear doubtful
in result. Yet a decision either way on this particular presumption
would not go to the warp or woof of our law. It is cited here simply
as an example of a possible change in the roster of recognized presump-
tions.""8
Phrased in more general terms, the question presented is: What
roster of presumptions would the court continue to recognize after
adoption of new rules? If additions may be made to the present list,
deletions are no less possible. If the court would find that the Uniform
Rules would change the result in a particular situation so long as the
analysis bears the "presumption" label, will the court change the label
to insure no change in the law? This may prove a perfectly proper
and desirable result with a basis in the precedents. There has in fact
been a history of the use of the "presumption" label to develop a rule
of law in Pennsylvania followed by retention of the rule after all men-
tion of presumptions has ceased." 9 This is not difficult to understand,
for the briefest reflection on as typical a case as MacDonald 120 will
demonstrate that precisely the same conclusions can be reached without
reference to the presumption of negligence, talking only of the right
to get to the jury, the risk of non-persuasion and the burden of going
forward.
Interrelationship with the Substantive Law
To understand such changes in terminology as have been oc-
curring and to evaluate their implications, it is necessary to consider
the role of presumptions in the development of the substantive law and
the role of the substantive law in the development of presumptions.
Particularly is this true in the tort area. Mr. Justice Musmanno only
a year ago explained the function of one of the Pennsylvania presump-
tions, commonly invoked in accident cases, in terms of its impact on
"correlative social responsibility." 121 This is neither startling nor
novel: Bohlen called attention to the role of the rebuttable presumption
in allowing courts to go half-way on the road to a redefinition of sub-
stantive law, in making for "a compromise between the modem theory
117. See text at note 79 supra et seq.
118. Judge Braham furnishes another example in connection with admissibility
of records. He suggests the possibility of "developing the theory of a presumption
of validity for a record made by a private person under command of the law."
Braham, Case Records of Hospitals and Doctors as Evidence Under the Business
Records Act, 21 TEm,. L.Q. 113, 120 (1947).
119. See text following note 126 infra.
120. MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944) discussed
in text at note 92 supra.
121. Fullerton v. Motor Express, Inc., 375 Pa. 173, 176, 100 A.2d 73, 74 (1953).
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of tort liability as based exclusively on fault and the more modern
renaissance of the ancient concept that every one must answer for the
harm done even by his most innocent acts." 22 The rebuttable pre-
sumption, Bohlen continues, is often a device for allowing courts to
adjust the rights of the litigants "as though the fact assumed did
exist" ' while they yet refuse definitively to change the substantive
rule by holding the fact in question legally irrelevant. "And the com-
mon law," he concludes, "has never shrunk from such compromise if
by the sacrifice of logic and symmetry it could reach a workable
rule." 124 Modem appellate opinions on presumptions leave one with
no less of a feeling that once again the substantive law is developing
within the "interstices of procedure." "5 This is not only true with
respect to the presumption of negligence, of due care by a deceased, of
a servant having acted within the scope of his employment if the truck
he drove had defendant's name on its side, but with respect to other
presumptions as well."
What is important, however, is that having developed a particular
rule aided by presumption analysis, it has been possible for the courts
to continue it unchanged while abandoning talk of presumption law
and analysis of presumption precedents. Instance treatment of the
bailor-bailee situation. Presumptions played their role in developing
a rule which finally provided that on a showing of the bailment, demand
and failure to return, plaintiff bailor had established a prima facie
case. 127  Thereafter it was for defendant to explain the cause of loss,
his being the burden of going forward with the evidence. When the
problem came to the supreme court in 1950, a lucid opinion describes
the various burdens and the procedural risks without any mention of
presumptions.12 8  Half a century earlier, there had been much the same
experience with respect to the presumption of consideration in a suit on
122. Bohlen, supra note 91, at 316.
123. Id. at 317.
124. Id. at 318.
125. The phrase is taken from Maine who wrote that "substantive law has at
first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure." Quoted in
MArrLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTiON AT Commo LAw 1 (1936 ed.). Perhaps it is
important to recognize that if substantive law has developed in the interstices of
presumption, so has presumption law developed in the interstices of substantive
considerations.
126. See LADD, op. cit. supra note 54, at 751: "A more realistic consideration
of the problem may be to eliminate the thought of presumption as shifting the burden
and test the proper placement of the obligation of establishing proof upon substantive
grounds."
127. See Schell v. Miller North Broad Storage Co., 142 Pa. Super. 293, 16 A.2d
680 (1940); Note, 55 DIcK. L. REv. 76 (1950).
128. Hershey v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 366 Pa. 158, 76 A.2d 379 (1950).
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a negotiable instrument -9and only a year ago an opinion dealing with
negligence of a railroad found no need for presumption talk.lao
Many of the rules developed by way of presumptions thus may be
expected to persevere as equitable solutions of the procedural problems
of negligence law, agency law or family law, or to serve as the bases
for further refinements within the framework of those subjects. This
is all to the good. Clarity, and conceivably some small measure of
economy from a reduction in appellate litigation, may result. Further-
more, a measure of additional flexibility may be achieved when a
judge or attorney dealing with carriers or marked trucks is emanci-
pated from concern over the suicide cases or the procedural impact of
reputation and cohabitation.
So much is true without reference to new rules and changed
formulations. It is not hard to see that a proposed change in the treat-
ment of presumptions may accelerate the process. Thus if we were
to conclude that the Uniform Rules would make some difference in
the law governing the presumption of negligence, it is not altogether
unlikely that the court, if it thought the present result a desirable one,
would allow it to remain unchanged. Nor is it improbable that the
court, faced with the obligation of interpreting and applying new pro-
visions not tailored especially for the negligence situation, might find
appealing the suggestion of Dean Mason Ladd and "test the proper
placement of the obligation of establishing proof on substantive
grounds." 1"1
129. First Nat. Bank of Bangor v. Paff, 240 Pa. 513, 87 Atl. 841 (1913) which
cites Conmey v. Macfarlane, 97 Pa. 361 (1881) and follows it-the last-mentioned
case having been decided. on a presumption rationale, but the Paff opinion not even
mentioning the term. The problem is currently governed in Pennsylvania by the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 3-306,
3-307, 3-408 (Purdon 1954). In view of the fact that the UCC was developed by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American
Law Institute as a joint project, and the same two bodies cooperated on the drafting
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and approving them, it is interesting to contrast
the treatment of presumptions in the two proposals. The UCC provides in § 1-201 (31)
that "'Presumption' or 'presumed' means that the trier of fact must find the exist-
ence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced which would
support a finding of its non-existence." The important thing, however, is that the
UCC was drafted with this definition in mind, other terminology being available to
express the risk of non-persuasion. See definition of "Burden of establishing" a fact,
§ 1-201 (8).
130. Mack v. Reading Co., 173 Pa. Super. 296, 98 A2d 399 (1953), aff'd, 377
Pa. 135, 103 A.2d 749 (1954). In the latter opinion Mr. Chief Justice Stern also
talks in terms of burden of going forward, etc., but explains that the result follows
even though there is no presumption of negligence. That the case talked "exclusive
control" is not significant for our purposes, nor would differences between the doc-
trines of exclusive control and res ipsa loquitur affect the conclusion in the text.
See also the treatment in such cases as Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451
(1953) and Commonwealth v. Montour Transport. Co., 365 Pa. 72, 73 A.2d 659
(1950).
131. See note 126 supra.
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The Uniform Rules may also be expected to resolve another con-
troversy of long standing with respect to presumptions, and to resolve
it in a manner entirely consistent with Pennsylvania practice. One
school of thought, associated primarily, but not exclusively with Thayer
theory,13 2 would proscribe the word presumption from the judge's
charge, banning the term from within earshot of the jury. Contrary
minded are those who believe that "the jury needs guidance in this
situation if they are to give due effect to the probabilities and frequently
the substantive policy" 133 on which a particular presumption is based.
Although the text of Rule 14.is silent on the subject of what to tell
the jury about presumptions, the comment thereto makes it abundantly
clear that the Commissioners do not favor the policy of silence. They
refer with approval to the "common-sense practice of charging the jury
as to certain presumptions having a substantial backing of prob-
ability." 134
What the jury is told about presumptions is particularly important
in situations where the person against whom the presumption operates
already has the burden of proof in its fullest sense. Instance the pre-
sumption that one killed in an accident was exercising due care.a'
When plaintiff administrator brings suit, the burden of proving con-
tributory negligence is already on defendant."" The presumption af-
fects neither the duty to go forward nor the obligation to convince the
trier of fact." 7 Indeed, it has been likened to a "handkerchief thrown
132. URE Rule 14, comment. Cf. Judge Lummus during the American Law
Institute debate: "The judge never ought to use the word 'presumption' to the
jury under either rule." 18 PROCEEINGs A.L.I. 211 (1941) quoted in Falknor,
supra note 34 at 987 n.145.
133. URE Rule 14, comment. Urging that the judge should charge in terms of
presumptions in appropriate circumstances is McCormick, What Shall the Trial
Judge Tell the Jury About Presumptions? 13 WASH. L. REv. 185 (1938), criticized
in Falknor, Notes o Presumptions, 15 WASH. L. REv. 71, 80-81 n.26 (1940).
134. URE Rule 14, comment.
135. Bragdon v. Pittsburgh Ry., 375 Pa. 307, 100 A.2d 378 (1953); Baker v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 369 Pa. 413, 85 A.2d 416 (1952); Bernstein, The Presumption
of Due Care-An Analysis, 20 PA. B.A.Q. 24 (1948).
136. See Bernstein, supra note 135, at 27, 28 and authorities cited. In Renne-
kamp v. Blair, 375 Pa. 620, 101 A.2d 669 (1954), the presumption of due care
was invoked, not on the issue of contributory negligence (and thus in "aid" of
plaintiff), but rather on the issue of negligence (for the "benefit" of defendant).
Deceased was the pilot of defendant's plane which had crashed and the opinion states
that he would be presumed to have exercised due care, thus exculpating defendant
in the absence of proof of negligence. Inasmuch as the burden of establishing
negligence was on the plaintiff in the first instance, once again no change has been
effected. However, this use of the presumption of due care may give rise to a prob-
lem in conflicting presumptions should it be invoked in a case where the relationship
of carrier and paying passenger gave rise to a presumption of negligence.
137. For which reason Falknor, supra note 133, argues that the presumption
should be abolished. Of course, a different situation is presented in jurisdictions
which consider freedom from contributory negligence plaintiff's burden. See LAND,
op. cit. supra note 54, at 748. Not to be confused with this problem are the cases
in which plaintiff's evidence makes clear that the deceased was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, thus leaving no room for operation of a presumption.
Basel v. Pittsburgh, 350 Pa. 545, 39 A.2d 582 (1944).
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over something covered by a blanket." 1"8 Yet, the presumption may
well have a significant impact on the jury if they are told of its exist-
ence in the law.'39 True, a presumption is not evidence nor may it be
weighed with evidence, but reference to it serves as a permissible form
of comment on the evidence, pointing up in significant manner the in-
ference potential of the human instinct for self-preservation and the
weight which may properly be attached to it.
1 40
Charging in terms of presumptions is a practice of long standing
in Pennsylvania.14' There is even supreme court language which
would appear to make such a charge mandatory in some situations."
While it may well be doubted that an adequate submission of the issues
without use of the term would constitute reversible error,143 it seems
clear that the Uniform Rules would effect no change in current law,
serving only as a preventive to possible recrudescence of the argument
on silence.
138. Lummus, J., concurring in Brown v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192, 196, 189
N.E. 41, 43 (1934). See also Susser v. Wiley, 350 Pa. 427, 430-31, 39 A.2d 616, 618
(1944).
139. See Falknor, supra note 133, at 77 n.21.
140. See McCormick, supra note 133, at 187-88; for a listing of the minority
of jurisdictions in which comment on the evidence by the trial judge is allowed
(including Pennsylvania) see VAND=ILT, op. cit. supra note 46 at 229. Although
the need for use of the term presumption is greater where there is no right of com-
ment, and it is certainly true that a judge may accomplish virtually the same thing
by discussion of the inference, charging in terms of "presumptions" may, in many
cases, prove a ready means of conveying to the jury the judicial recognition accorded
to the particular inference.
141. See, e.g., Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 Atl.
644 (1934); Walters v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 318 Pa. 382, 178 Atl. 499
(1935). In Susser v. Wiley, 350 Pa. 427, 431, 39 A.2d 616, 618 (1944) Mr. Justice
(now Chief Justice) Stern refers to a charge in terms of the presumption of due
care as "the form ordinarily employed." This practice is understandable as Pennsyl-
vania had not accepted Thayer theory, and no less so post-Watkins and MacDonald
in view of the Pennsylvania position that a presumption disappeared only after the
jury had passed on and accepted the rebutting evidence. As pointed out earlier in the
text at note 100 supra, some judges avoid the term, preferring to rely on alternative
formulations. See note 140 supra.
142. "The jury should have been instructed that, from the testimony adduced,
a prima facie legal presumption arose that the appellee was negligent in the operation
of its trolley car and that the burden was upon it to disprove that presumption."
Archer v. Pittsburgh Ry., 349 Pa. 547, 549, 37 A2d 539, 540 (1944). For discussion
of the ambiguity in the term "burden" see note 87 mipra.
143. But cf. "Perhaps, as a purely procedural matter, plaintiff would have been
entitled to an instruction as to the presumption of due care, had request therefor
been made. . . ." Needleman v. Lloyd, 55 D. & C. 581, 586 (1946). The court
goes on, however, to point out that in the particular case the judge would have
been bound to couple such a charge with the statement that "the question of con-
tributory negligence of the deceased would have to be decided on the evidence
produced directed to that question and not on the presumption." Id. at 587. The
case holds that in the absence of a request, failure to charge on the presumption
was not the basis for a new trial. The supreme court has so held: Susser v. Wiley,
350 Pa. 427, 39 A.2d 616 (1944). It is difficult to conceive that a court would
find prejudicial error and reverse for failure to use the term presumption in the
charge, if the burdens and the issues had been adequately presented in other ter-
minology.
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In sum, then, the Uniform Rules present a rational, practicable
approach to presumptions. In large measure, they have promulgated
for general acceptance the view to which Pennsylvania long adhered
as a minority of one. 44 However practical and satisfactory Pennsyl-
vania holdings are in this area, the "law" is somewhat complex and
there is ample evidence that a measure of relief from the complexity
would prove a boon to the bar. Judge Learned Hand made the point
in striking fashion when he said of presumption law: "Judges have
mixed it up until nobody can tell what on earth it means and the
important thing is to get something which is workable and which can
be understood and I don't care much what it is." 145 Certainly the
Rules would appear to meet the criteria about which Judge Hand does
care. They may be expected to effect some changes in Pennsylvania
law, although these would hardly be termed radical. There may, in
fairness, be some expenditure of time and money to accomplish the
transition. The net result, however, is likely to be a product more
readily understood and more easily applied. If this be so, the price
of the change will have proved worthwhile.
(to be concluded)
144. 18 PROCEEDINGS A.L.I. 211 (1941).
145. Id. at 217-18. Cf. Judge Augustus Hand speaking at the same session
of the American Law Institute which was discussing which provision to adopt as
the Model Code rule: "I have been converted, reconverted, unconverted, deceived,
disillusioned and had all sorts of things done to me in this field . . . and I really
believe, as I feel now-I may change in five minutes-in this confusing subject. . ...
18 PROCEEDINGs A.L.I. 208-09 (1941), quoted in Falknor, supra note 34, at 987 n.145.
The Institute vote was 59 to 42 on the question of which rule to adopt. 18 PROCEED-
INGS A.L.I. 226 (1941). Cf. 9 WiGMom, EVIDENCE § 2498 (a), p. 335 (3d ed. 1940) ;
"No one who has recorded his views upon this subject has expressed contentment
with the present condition of the law."
